UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Amado de Jesus MORENO; Nelda Yolanda REYES; Jose CANTARERO ARGUETA; Haydee AVILEZ ROJAS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Kirstjen NIELSEN, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in her official capacity; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; L. Francis CISSNA, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, in his official capacity; U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:18-cv-01135-RRM

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

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American Immigration Council
1331 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20005

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I. INTRODUCTION AND PROPOSED CLASS DEFINITION

This case involves noncitizens who have maintained lawful Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for years—in many cases, close to two decades—and who, during this time, established close relationships with U.S. citizens and businesses. Relying upon these relationships, they now seek to become lawful permanent residents (LPRs) pursuant to the adjustment of status statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1255. However, Defendants, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), its component agency U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and the heads of both agencies, have denied or will deny their applications based on a written policy that Plaintiffs allege violates the TPS statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4), and the adjustment statute, § 1255.

Plaintiffs seek to certify a class on behalf of similarly situated TPS holders who are subject to USCIS' written policy; namely, TPS holders who entered the United States without inspection, subsequently were granted TPS by USCIS, and who have applied or will apply with USCIS to adjust to LPR status. To adjust their status, Plaintiffs and class members must demonstrate that they were "inspected and admitted or paroled" into the United States. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1255(k) (requiring a lawful admission to be exempted from the bar to adjustment for unlawful presence). Plaintiffs contend, in accord with the plain language of the TPS statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4), that the grant of TPS constitutes an inspection and admission for purposes of adjusting status; because all have been granted TPS—and thus necessarily have been inspected and admitted for purposes of adjustment—their initial entries without inspection do not prevent them from demonstrating eligibility under § 1255. The Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits ruled that the plain language of the TPS statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4), compels this interpretation. *Ramirez v. Brown*, 852 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2017); *Flores v. USCIS*, 718 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2013).

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Defendants' policy, found in the USCIS Policy Manual, rejects this interpretation, stating that the grant of TPS does not constitute an inspection and admission for purposes of adjustment. *See* USCIS, USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 7, Part B, Ch. 2(A)(5) (May 23, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-Volume7-PartB-Chapter2.html. Defendants' only support for their position is the per curiam decision *Serrano v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 655 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2011), issued prior to the *Ramirez* and *Flores* decisions and rejected by both of those courts. Defendants apply this policy throughout the United States, except within the jurisdictions of the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, where they are compelled to apply the respective circuit decisions. Pursuant to this policy, Defendant USCIS has denied or will deny the adjustment applications of all Plaintiffs and proposed class members based upon an alleged lack of an inspection and admission or parole.

Plaintiffs seek injunctive, declaratory, and mandamus relief to remedy Defendants' unlawful interpretation of the TPS statute. The scope of the proposed class consists of TPS holders within the jurisdictions where USCIS will rely on the policy when adjudicating adjustment applications of TPS holders who initially entered without inspection, have applied or will apply to adjust to LPR status, and whose adjustment applications have been or will be denied based upon Defendants' policy.

This case presents a question of law common to all Plaintiffs and class members: whether USCIS' policy of finding TPS holders ineligible for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255 violates the TPS statute and the Administrative Procedure Act. This question can be resolved on a class-wide basis, making certification appropriate. Pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs respectfully move this Court to certify the following class with named Plaintiffs as class representatives:

> All individuals with TPS who reside within the geographic boundaries of the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits; whose initial entries into the United States were without inspection; who have applied or will apply for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence with USCIS; and whose adjustment applications have been or will be denied on the basis of USCIS' policy that TPS does not constitute an admission for purposes of adjusting status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255.

See Dkt. 12, ¶ 65. Plaintiffs seek to ensure that Defendants timely adjudicate their and class members' adjustment applications in accord with the plain language of the TPS statute.

II. BACKGROUND

In assessing whether Rule 23 requirements have been met, the court should consider the merits "only to the extent they overlap with Rule 23's inquiry." *Brooks v. Roberts*, 251 F. Supp. 3d 401, 415 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011)). To facilitate any review that may be necessary, Plaintiffs provide a summary of their merits claims here. *See also* Dkt. 12, Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint.

A. Overview of the Facts and Law

Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class reside within the jurisdictions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits. All entered the United States without inspection but subsequently applied for and were granted TPS by USCIS, after demonstrating that they did not have a disqualifying criminal record and were otherwise admissible. After years of living in the country in this lawful—although nonpermanent—status, they seek to become LPRs based on visa petitions filed by U.S. citizen family members or employers on their behalf. However, USCIS has denied or will deny their applications solely due to Defendants' policy, which fails to acknowledge a grant of TPS as an inspection and admission for purposes of adjustment of status. Plaintiffs contend that this policy violates 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4).

TPS provides a temporary haven for noncitizens living in the United States when natural

disasters or civil strife render their home countries unsafe for return. Noncitizens granted TPS by USCIS have non-permanent lawful status. While in TPS, beneficiaries are protected from removal and eligible for work authorization. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1). During their many years as TPS holders, Plaintiffs and proposed class members have integrated fully into their communities in the United States. Some were brought to the United States as children and have never left. *See, e.g.*, Exh. E, Shafiqullah Dec. ¶¶ 4-5 (describing Haitian client trafficked into United States at age 14 and Salvadoran client brought in at age 2 or 3); Exh. J, Volpe Dec. ¶ 4b (client arrived at age 8); Exh. T, Hall Dec. ¶ 4 (client arrived at age 9); Exh. G, Nowak Dec. ¶ 3a (client entered at about age 10). Others, like Plaintiff Cantarero Argueta, have been here for most or all of their adult lives. Dkt. 12 ¶ 34; Exh. CC, Cantareo-Argueta Dec. ¶ 4; *see also*, Exh. P, Sharma-Crawford Dec. ¶ 7 (describing clients in their forties and fifties who have lived in the United States for close to 20 years); Exh. C, Liberles Dec. ¶¶ 4-5 (describing clients living here since 1992 and 1995, respectively). Others are near retirement age, such as Plaintiffs Reyes and Avilez Rojas. Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 29, 41; Exh. BB, Reyes Dec. ¶ 2; Exh. DD, Avilez-Rojas Dec. ¶ 2; *see also* Exh. M, Garcia Dec. ¶ 4 (describing 61-year-old client who worked in United States in healthcare industry for many years).

During their time in the United States, Plaintiffs and class members marry, raise U.S. citizen children, purchase homes, work, pursue training and education, and join churches and community groups.[1] Many work in construction, landscaping, health care, food services, and retail jobs. *See, e.g.*, Exh. D, Pilsbury Dec. ¶ 4 (describing generally jobs held by a large number

[1] *See, e.g.*, Center for American Progress, *TPS Holders in the United States* (2017), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2017/10/19125633/101717_ TPSFactsheet-USA.pdf; Robert Warren and Donald Kerwin, *A Statistical and Demographic Profile of the US Temporary Protected Status Populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti*, 5 J. Migr. & Hum. Sec. 577 (2017), http://jmhs.cmsny.org/index.php/jmhs/article/view/99.

of her Salvadoran clients); Exh. L, Taylor Dec. ¶ 4 (client works in school cafeteria); Exh. O, Takhsh Dec. ¶ 4 (client worked as nursing assistant and in housekeeping services); Exh. S, Peterson Dec. ¶ 5 (client worked in bakery). Some have held their jobs for many years. For example, Plaintiff Moreno has worked as a telemarketer for the same employer for over 17 years, while Plaintiff Cantarero Argueta has worked in the kitchens of two employers for approximately 12 years. Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 22, 37; Exh. AA, Moreno Dec. ¶ 6; Exh. CC, Cantarero Argueta Dec. ¶¶ 5-7; *see also*, Exh. R, Blackford Dec. ¶ 4 (clients worked as manual laborers for approximately 10 and 25 years, respectively); Exh. Q, Loesch Dec. ¶ 4 (client worked for 8 years at meat-processing plant and last several years at cabinet-making company); Exh. J, Volpe Dec. ¶ 4a (client worked many years in construction); Exh. C, Liberles Dec. ¶ 4 (client worked at store for 5 years). In many cases, such as that of Plaintiff Cantarero Argueta, their families depend on them for support. Dkt. 12 ¶ 37; Exh. CC, Cantarero Argueta Dec. ¶ 11; *see also*, Exh. B, Estrada Dec. ¶ 4 (describing two clients whose families depend on them for support); Exh. O, Takhsh Dec. ¶ 4 (client is sole support for injured husband and 4-year-old child); Exh. R, Blackford Dec. ¶ 4 (client is sole support for his disabled U.S. citizen wife and three U.S. citizen children); Exh. C, Liberles Dec. ¶ 4 (widowed client is sole support for her U.S. citizen children).

Plaintiffs and proposed class members seek to adjust to LPR status to avoid being forcibly separated from their families, homes, and employment. Each is eligible for a visa based on their relationship with a U.S. citizen spouse, adult child, parent, or employer—a prerequisite for adjustment of status. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (requiring that an adjustment applicant be eligible to receive an immigrant visa and that a visa be immediately available).

An applicant for adjustment of status generally must show that he or she was "inspected and admitted or paroled." 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). The TPS statute provides that, for purposes of

adjustment of status, TPS holders are "considered as being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant." 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4). Two Courts of Appeals have held that, pursuant to the plain language of this provision, a TPS holder is deemed to have been inspected and admitted because he or she is deemed to be in "lawful nonimmigrant status." *Ramirez*, 852 F.3d at 960-61; *Flores*, 718 F.3d at 553-554. *But see Serrano*, 655 F.3d 1260.

Defendants comply with the plain language of the statute when adjudicating the adjustment applications of TPS holders within the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. However, in the jurisdictions covered by the proposed class, Defendants have a policy of denying the adjustment of status applications of TPS holders who initially entered without inspection and admission, refusing to give effect to 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4) and refusing to acknowledge that the grant of TPS constitutes the inspection and admission required to adjust status. Defendants have denied, or will deny, the adjustment applications of all Plaintiffs and class members in reliance on this policy. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy Defendants' violation of the statute.

B. Named Plaintiffs' Factual Backgrounds

Amado De Jesus Moreno

Plaintiff Amado De Jesus Moreno is a 45-year-old noncitizen from El Salvador who resides with his wife and two U.S. citizen children, ages 6 and 12, in Brooklyn, New York.[2] He also has two sons, currently ages 19 and 24, who reside in El Salvador. He first entered the United States without inspection in August 2000. The following year, USCIS granted him TPS. He has maintained that status for more than sixteen years, renewing it and the attendant

[2] All facts related to Plaintiff Moreno are taken from Dkt. 12, ¶¶ 19-28 and his declaration, Exh. AA.

employment authorization regularly as required by USCIS. In 2011, Plaintiff Moreno traveled outside of the United States—with advance approval from USCIS—and DHS inspected and paroled him into the country upon his return.

Plaintiff Moreno has worked as a telemarketer for the same employer, Jersey Lynne Farms, for approximately 18 years. His employer has filed the necessary paperwork to obtain a visa for him, which has been approved. His employer intends to promote him as a customer services manager upon his receipt of lawful permanent residence. In this managerial position, he would be responsible for supervising four telemarketers, handling complaints, taking orders, and responding to Spanish speaking customers.

With an approved visa petition, Plaintiff Moreno filed an application to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident with USCIS on or about January 15, 2015. At the same time, he filed an application on behalf of his sons in El Salvador—both of whom, at the time, were children as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)—to allow them to obtain visas as his derivatives. USCIS denied his adjustment application, contending that he was ineligible to adjust his status because he had entered without inspection and failed to maintain a lawful status from the date of his entry until his receipt of TPS. Plaintiff Moreno requested that USCIS reopen its decision, arguing that he was eligible to adjust because he had been inspected and paroled and, additionally, that he was eligible for an exemption from the unlawful presence bar to adjustment pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(k). On July 14, 2017, USCIS denied Plaintiff Moreno's reopening request, finding him ineligible for the § 1255(k) exemption because that section applies only if the individual was "admitted" to the United States, and a parole is not an admission. Exh. X (USCIS denial). As a result, USCIS indicated that his period of unlawful presence prior to his grant of TPS disqualified him for adjustment of status.

But for Defendants' unlawful policy, Plaintiff Moreno's adjustment application would not have been denied on this basis. Instead, had USCIS treated his grant of TPS as an inspection and admission for purposes of his adjustment of status application, the agency would have found that he was eligible for the § 1255(k) exemption and adjustment of status.

Plaintiff Moreno was harmed and continues to be harmed by this denial. Without permanent resident status, he has not received the promotion and accompanying pay raise promised by his employer. His sons, as derivatives on his application, have not been able to get in the visa queue and move forward with their own efforts to join their father and family in the United States. Finally, Plaintiff Moreno will lose TPS and the attendant employment authorization in 15 months when the TPS designation for El Salvador is terminated. Without employment authorization, he will lose his job and be unable to support his family. Without a status adjustment, he also will be at risk of deportation to a country in which he has not resided for close to 18 years. If deported, he would have to take his minor U.S. citizen daughters with him, as there is no one in the United States who could provide for them. He does not want to deprive them of the opportunities that life in the United States affords. For all of these reasons, he wishes to have his adjustment application fairly adjudicated in accordance with the law.

Nelda Yolanda Reyes

Plaintiff Nelda Yolanda Reyes is a 64-year-old noncitizen from Honduras who resides in Green Bay, Wisconsin.[3] She has five adult children. She was granted TPS valid as of July 1999, after her initial entry without inspection in in or about November 1989. She has maintained her

[3] All facts related to Plaintiff Reyes are taken from Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 29-33 and her declaration, Exh. BB.

TPS status for close to nineteen years.

Plaintiff Reyes' adult U.S. citizen son filed an immigrant visa petition on her behalf with USCIS on or about October 14, 2015. USCIS approved this visa petition on May 30, 2018. *See* Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter, MSJ), Exh. KK, I-130 Approval Notice. Concurrent with the immigrant visa petition filing, Plaintiff Reyes filed her adjustment of status application with USCIS. On or about November 12, 2015, USCIS sent Plaintiff Reyes a request for evidence establishing that she had been admitted or paroled into the United States. Her attorney responded on February 1, 2016, explaining that her grant of TPS constituted an inspection and admission for purposes of adjustment, in accord with the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4).

On September 5, 2015, USCIS denied the adjustment application, stating that Plaintiff Reyes had failed to demonstrate eligibility when she failed to produce evidence that she had been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States. Exh. Y (USCIS denial). But for Defendants' unlawful policy, Plaintiff Reyes' adjustment application would not have been denied on this basis. Instead, had USCIS treated her grant of TPS as an inspection and admission for purposes of her adjustment application, it would not have found her ineligible.

Plaintiff Reyes was harmed and continues to be harmed by this denial. In January of 2020, she will lose TPS and the attendant employment authorization when the TPS designation for Honduras is terminated. In addition, Plaintiff Reyes will face deportation to a country in which she has not resided for close to three decades. She would be separated from her family. For these reasons, she wishes to have her adjustment application fairly adjudicated in accordance with the law.

Jose Cantarero Argueta

Plaintiff Jose Cantarero Argueta is a 40-year-old noncitizen from Honduras who resides in Mt. Airy, Maryland with his wife and two U.S. citizen children, ages 14 and 15.[4] He first entered the United States without inspection in April 1997, and subsequently USCIS granted him TPS in 2000. He has remained in that status for more than 17 years. In 2014, he traveled outside of the United States with advance permission from USCIS; upon his return, DHS inspected and paroled him back into the country.

Plaintiff Cantarero Argueta has worked as kitchen manager since 2006, with two different employers. In 2014 and 2015, his then employer, Unlimited Ventures, took the necessary steps to sponsor him for a visa. USCIS subsequently approved his visa petition. Plaintiff Cantarero Argueta also filed an application for adjustment of status based upon the then-pending visa petition in 2015. While his application was pending, Unlimited Ventures sold the company, and Plaintiff Cantarero Argueta returned to full-time employment with his prior employer, MJJ Enterprises. He subsequently filed the necessary paperwork regarding this change in employment with USCIS, thus demonstrating his continuing eligibility to adjust status based upon the approved visa petition filed by Unlimited Ventures. He remains employed as a kitchen manager by MJJ Enterprises.

On February 9, 2018, USCIS sent Plaintiff Cantarero Argueta a Notice of Intent to Deny his adjustment application because his parole in 2014 is not an admission, and without an admission he is not eligible for a waiver of the bar to adjustment for unlawful presence under § 1255(k). Exh. Z (USCIS Notice of Intent to Deny). On March 1, 2018, Plaintiff Cantarero Argueta responded to this Notice by explaining that he was inspected and admitted when he was

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[4] All facts related to Plaintiff Cantarero Argueta are taken from Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 34-40 and his declaration, Exh. CC.

granted TPS and therefore is eligible for the § 1255(k) waiver. MSJ, Exh. OO, Cover letter of Response to NOID. Nevertheless, USCIS will rely on its policy of not treating a grant of TPS as an inspection and admission for purposes of adjustment to deny Plaintiff Cantarero Argueta's adjustment application. But for Defendants' unlawful policy, USCIS would find Plaintiff Cantarero Argueta eligible for the exemption from the unlawful presence bar to adjustment of status found in § 1255(k).

Plaintiff Cantarero Argueta will be harmed when USCIS denies his adjustment application. In January of 2020, he will lose TPS and the attendant employment authorization when the TPS designation for Honduras is terminated, and thus will be unable to continue working. He also will face deportation to a country in which he has not resided for over 21 years. Deportation would split his family apart, depriving his minor U.S. citizen children of their father, the primary wage earner for the family. For these reasons, he wishes to have his adjustment application fairly adjudicated in accordance with the law.

Haydee Avilez Rojas

Plaintiff Haydee Avilez Rojas is a 64-year-old noncitizen from Honduras who resides in Plainfield, New Jersey with her 70-year-old U.S. citizen husband.[5] She has lived at the same address for more than 15 years. She has three adult children. She suffers from high blood pressure, and her husband has had two prostate surgeries.

Plaintiff Avilez Rojas first entered the United States without inspection on or about May 1998. In February 2000, USCIS granted her TPS. She has maintained that status for more than 18 years, renewing it and the attendant employment authorization as required by USCIS.

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[5] All facts related to Plaintiff Avilez Rojas are taken from Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 41-45 and her declaration, Exh. DD.

Plaintiff Avilez Rojas' husband filed an immigrant visa petition on her behalf with USCIS on or about February 15, 2017. USCIS approved this petition on September 13, 2017. On or about February 15, 2018, Plaintiff Avilez Rojas filed her adjustment of status application by mailing it to USCIS. Although USCIS has not yet adjudicated the application, USCIS will rely on its policy of not treating a grant of TPS as an inspection and admission for purposes of adjustment to deny Plaintiff Avilez Rojas' application. But for Defendants' unlawful policy, USCIS would find Plaintiff Avilez Rojas eligible for adjustment of status.

Plaintiff Avilez Rojas will be harmed when USCIS denies her adjustment application. In January of 2020, when DHS terminates the TPS designation for Honduras, Plaintiff Avilez Rojas will lose her status; unless she is able to gain lawful permanent residence, she also will lose her Social Security retirement income, which she and her U.S. citizen husband depend on to meet their monthly expenses. Without status, she also will face deportation to Honduras, a country in which she has not resided for over two decades. Deportation would separate her from her husband. Given her age and medical problems, she will be unable to support herself in Honduras. Furthermore, Plaintiff Avilez Rojas' U.S. citizen husband will suffer hardship if she is deported. For all these reasons, she wishes to have her adjustment application fairly adjudicated in accordance with the law.

III. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE CLASS

Plaintiffs and proposed class members seek certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2) to challenge Defendants' policy of refusing to treat the grant of TPS as an inspection and admission for purposes of adjustment of status.

While a plaintiff must satisfy all Rule 23 requirements for class certification, the Second Circuit employs a "liberal rather than restrictive construction of Rule 23, adopt[ing] a standard of

flexibility in deciding whether to grant certification." *Bourlas v. Davis Law Assocs.*, 237 F.R.D. 345, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (quotation omitted). In fact, "the Second Circuit's general preference is for granting rather than denying class certification." *Gortat v. Capala Bros., Inc.*, 257 F.R.D. 353, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quotation omitted).

Under Rule 23(a), the party seeking class certification must establish that: (1) "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Under Rule 23(b)(2), Plaintiffs also must show that "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

Certification here is consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2). "Rule 23(b)(2) is designed to assist and is most commonly relied upon by litigants seeking institutional reform in the form of injunctive relief." *Hill v. City of New York*, 136 F. Supp. 3d 304, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting *Marisol A. v. Giuliani*, 929 F. Supp. 662, 692 (S.D.N.Y.1996), *aff'd*, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir.1997)). Moreover, "[c]lass certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is particularly appropriate in civil rights litigation." *Id*. (quoting *Stinson v. City of New York*, 282 F.R.D. 360, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). Here, Plaintiffs seek only such relief and, absent class certification, most proposed class members never will be treated as eligible to adjust to lawful resident status.

A. This Action Satisfies the Class Certification Requirements of Rule 23(a)

1. The Proposed Class Members Are So Numerous That Joinder Is Impracticable

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be "so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable." Impracticable does not mean impossible, but "only that the difficulty or inconvenience of joining all members of the class make use of the class action appropriate." *Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC*, 504 F.3d 229, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2007). "[N]umerosity is presumed at a level of 40 members . . . ." *Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park*, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing 1 *Newberg on Class Actions* § 3.05 (2d ed. 1985); *see also Betrand v. Sava*, 684 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1982) (leaving "undisturbed" a district court's certification of a class of 53); *Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Group, Inc.*, 659 F.3d 234, 252 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding 275 sufficient); *V.W. v. Conway*, 236 F. Supp. 3d 554, 574 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding class of 86 sufficient).[6]

While a plaintiff must "show some evidence of or reasonably estimate the number of class members," a precise quantification is not required. *Kalkstein v. Collecto, Inc.*, 304 F.R.D. 114, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quotation omitted). Moreover, district courts "may make common sense assumptions to support a finding of numerosity." *Id.* (quotation omitted).

Plaintiffs do not know the precise size of the proposed class but approximate that there are several hundred to a few thousand potential class members. Dkt. 12 ¶ 66. As of October 2017, there were more than 260,000 TPS holders living within the geographic boundaries of the proposed class.[7] Of these, however, the class will contain only those who 1) entered without

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[6] This is consistent with cases in other jurisdictions. *See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ.*, 446 F.2d 763, 765-66 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding 20 class members sufficient); *Jones v. Diamond*, 519 F.2d 1090, 1100 & n.18 (5th Cir. 1975) (class membership of 48); *Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc.*, 555 F.2d 270, 275 (10th Cir. 1977) (41-46 class members); *McCluskey v. Trs. of Red Dot Corp. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan & Trust*, 268 F.R.D. 670, 673-76 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (certifying class with 27 known members).

[7] Relying on a report from the Congressional Research Service, Plaintiffs arrived at this figure by subtracting from the total number of TPS holders those who reside within the Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. *See* Jill H. Wilson, Cong. Research Serv., RS20844, *Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues*, 12, Table 2 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RS20844.pdf.

inspection and 2) are eligible to adjust either through a U.S. citizen spouse or adult child (an immediate relative) or are eligible for a § 1255(k) exemption and can thus adjust through a U.S. employer. Many TPS holders initially entered without inspection. *See, e.g.*, Exh. J, Volpe Dec. ¶ 3 (estimating that "significantly more" than 50 percent of her organization's 1,800 plus TPS clients entered without inspection); Exh. I, Miller Dec. ¶ 3 (indicating that the majority of her organization's 500 TPS clients entered without inspection).[8] As a result of their longstanding presence in U.S. communities, many TPS holders have U.S. citizen spouses, adult U.S. citizen children, or employers who have petitioned or will petition for an immigrant visa on their behalf, a prerequisite to the TPS holder filing an adjustment of status application. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Defendants easily can ascertain the exact number immigrant visa petitions filed on behalf of TPS holders, as well as adjustment applications filed by TPS holders. *Accord Barahona-Gomez v. Reno*, 167 F.3d 1228, 1237 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[Immigration officials are] uniquely positioned to ascertain class membership.").

Plaintiffs' estimate further is confirmed by the declarations of 20 immigration attorneys who, collectively, attest to knowledge of more than 700 current or potential clients who fall within the class. *See, e.g.*, Exh. D, Pilsbury Dec. ¶ 5 (at least 200 clients in New York who are class members); Exh. K., Yang Dec. ¶¶ 3, 7 [sic] (approximately 188 current and 250 former clients); Exh. A, Cortes del Olmo Dec. ¶ 4 (30-40 potential clients); Exh. P, Sharma-Crawford Dec. ¶ 5 (10-15 clients); Exh. B, Estrada Dec. ¶ 3 (12 clients); Exh. C, Liberles Dec. ¶ 3 (12 clients). Thus, although the proposed class contains only a portion of all TPS holders in the United States, these declarations demonstrate that there are at least several hundred, supporting a presumption that the class is so numerous that joinder would be impractical. *Consol. Rail Corp.*,

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[8] *Id.* at 5, Table 1.

47 F.3d at 483.

Moreover, as the Second Circuit has explained, "the numerosity inquiry is not strictly mathematical but must take into account the context of the particular case, in particular whether a class is superior to joinder based on other relevant factors including: (i) judicial economy, (ii) geographic dispersion, (iii) the financial resources of class members, (iv) their ability to sue separately, and (v) requests for injunctive relief that would involve future class members." *Pennsylvania Pub. Sch. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.*, 772 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing *Robidoux v. Celani*, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993)). Here, these factors—both alone and in combination—demonstrate that joinder is impractical.

First, a class action will preserve judicial resources, saving district courts throughout the United States from ruling on the legality of the same written USCIS policy. It similarly will ensure that the issue is resolved for all TPS holders who are eligible for adjustment of status, regardless of their financial resources or ability to pursue an individual action. *See, e.g.*, Exh. H, Hohenstein Dec. ¶ 6 (explaining why individual suits are prohibitive for many clients); Exh. D, Pilsbury Dec. ¶ 4 (indicating that many of her clients are low income). Moreover, timing is critical for Plaintiffs and class members, since the majority will lose their TPS status within a year to eighteen months and then become vulnerable to removal. However, USCIS can take a year or more to adjudicate an adjustment application. *See, e.g.*, Exh. A, Cortes del Olmo Dec. ¶ 6 (9 to 18 months in Boston, Massachusetts); Exh. E., Shafiqullah Dec. ¶ 10 (approximately one year in Brooklyn, New York); Exh. J, Volpe Dec. ¶ 9 (more than a year in Washington, DC, Maryland and Virginia region); Exh. N, Goodwin ¶ 5 (same, in Harlingen, Texas); Exh. T, Hall Dec. ¶ 6 (14 to 24 months in Aurora, Colorado). Given the urgency for a speedy resolution of the legality of USCIS' written policy, class litigation is preferable because it will resolve the

issue most efficiently.

Additionally, class certification is warranted because Plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief on behalf of future class members. *Robidoux*, 987 F.2d at 936; *see also Hawker v. Consovoy*, 198 F.R.D. 619, 625 (D.N.J. 2001) ("The joinder of potential future class members who share a common characteristic, but whose identity cannot be determined yet is considered impracticable."). The geographic dispersion of proposed class members also weighs in favor of class certification. The proposed class covers the localities where USCIS will rely on its unlawful policy to adjudicate adjustment of status applications.[9] *See Robidoux*, 987 F.2d at 936 (finding that the fact that class members were dispersed throughout Vermont weighed in favor of certification); *Brooks*, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 417-18 ("[P]laintiffs' class includes low income residents spread across New York, the sort of population that makes joinder of individual members a difficult proposition due to their geographic dispersion, limited if not non-existent financial resources, and the impracticability of each obtaining legal representation for their individual claims."). Moreover, Plaintiffs' evidence demonstrates that there are potential class members in each Circuit where USCIS will rely on, and apply, its unlawful policy.[10]

Plaintiffs have demonstrated the large number of current and future class members and the many reasons why "joinder of all members is impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).

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[9] In the cases of noncitizens residing other localities, who are outside of the proposed class definitions, USCIS will rely on a binding circuit decision.

[10] Specifically, for the First Circuit, see Exhs. A, Cortes del Olmo Dec., B, Estrada Dec., and C, Liberles Dec.; Second Circuit, see Exhs. D, Pilsbury Dec., E, Shafiqullah Dec., F, Friedland Dec., and G, Nowak Dec.; Third Circuit, see Exhs. H, Hohenstein Dec. and I, Miller Dec.; Fourth Cir., see Exh. J, Volpe Dec.; Fifth Circuit, see Exhs. K, Yang Dec., L, Taylor Dec., M, Garcia Dec., and N, Goodwin Dec.; Seventh Circuit, see Exh. O, Takhsh Dec.; Eighth Circuit, see Exhs. P, Sharma-Crawford Dec., Q, Loesch Dec.; R, Blackford Dec., and S, Peterson Dec.; Tenth Circuit, see Exh. T, Hall Dec., and P, Sharma-Crawford Dec.; District of Columbia Circuit, see Exh. J, Volpe Dec.

2. Because Plaintiffs' Claims Derive from Defendants' Common Practice, the Class Presents Common Questions of Law and Fact

Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be questions of law or fact that are common to the class. "Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury." *Wal-Mart Stores*, 564 U.S. at 349-50 (quotation omitted). "Courts have found that, despite differing individual circumstances of class members, commonality exists where injuries derive from a unitary course of conduct by a single system." *Kurtz v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.*, 321 F.R.D. 482, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (quotations omitted). Moreover, "[e]ven a single common question" will satisfy the rule. *Id*. at 529 (quoting *Wal-Mart Stores*, 564 U.S. at 359).

To establish the existence of a common question of law, the proposed class members' claims "must depend upon a common contention" that is "of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." *Wal-Mart Stores*, 564 U.S. at 350. Thus, "[w]hat matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common 'questions' . . . but, rather, the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common *answers* apt to drive the resolution of the litigation." *Id.* (quotation omitted).

Here, the central common legal question is whether Defendants' policy of not treating a grant of TPS as a qualifying inspection and admission for purposes of adjustment of status violates 8 U.S.C. §§ 1254a(f)(4) and 1255. The Court's answer to this question will "drive the resolution" of the case, and a favorable resolution for Plaintiffs will remedy the problem for all class members. *Wal-Mart Stores*, 564 U.S. at 350 (quotation omitted); *see also Shahriar*, 659 F.3d at 252 (finding plaintiffs' allegations that defendants' policies violated the Fair Labor Standards Act demonstrated commonality); *Dover v. British Airways, PLC (UK)*, 321 F.R.D. 49, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding "one common question that is central to Plaintiffs' case and

undisputedly capable of common resolution: the proper interpretation of the term 'fuel surcharges' in the Contract"); *Hill*, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 354 ("Another common question exists as to whether the City Defendants breached the [collective bargaining agreement] through its leave policies."). The proposed class members thus have raised a "common contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." *Wal-Mart Stores*, 564 U.S. at 350.

There are no factual differences in the circumstances of the proposed class members that are relevant. The salient common facts that all proposed class members, by definition, share—that they have been, or will be, subject to the Defendants' unlawful policy—are central to the case. Notably, Plaintiffs do not ask this Court to order Defendants to grant their adjustment of status applications; they are simply requesting that this Court review whether Defendants' policy—which is rendering them and all proposed class members ineligible for adjustment of status—violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). That proposed class members reside in different judicial circuits that have not yet reviewed the legality of the policy does not affect the commonality of the central legal question, for they all currently are subject to the same unlawful policy. Furthermore, the case presents an issue of statutory interpretation that is unaffected by any other binding precedent within the circuits; the statute which renders Defendants' policy unlawful applies equally in each of these circuits.

Nor does it undermine commonality that some proposed class members seek to adjust status based on family visas while others seek to adjust status based on employment visas. All proposed class members will have their adjustment applications denied by USCIS based on the same exact policy applied by Defendants: the refusal to recognize that 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4)

requires that USCIS deem TPS holders as being inspected and admitted for purposes of adjustment of status under § 1255. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), under which Plaintiffs seek certification, requires that "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class . . . ." Defendants do not employ a separate rationale or policy for denying family-based adjustment applications as compared to employment-based adjustment applications. Rule 23(b)(2) also requires that "the relief sought is exclusively or predominantly injunctive or declaratory." *Coco v. Inc. Vill. of Belle Terre*, 233 F.R.D. 109, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quotation omitted). As such, the questions presented apply equally to all class members regardless of any factual differences and are subject to common answers.

Indeed, even if this Court were to find that TPS holders seeking adjustment of status based on employment visas somehow present a marginally different situation than that presented by TPS holders seeking adjustment of status based on family visas, named Plaintiffs adequately represent both groups. *See* Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 11, 13 (describing Plaintiff Moreno's and Plaintiff Cantarero Argueta's adjustment eligibility based on visa petitions filed by U.S. employers); Exhs. AA ¶¶ 6-8, CC ¶¶ 7-9 (same); Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 12, 14 (describing Plaintiff Reyes' and Plaintiff Avilez Rojas' adjustment eligibility based on visa petitions filed by U.S. citizen family members); Exhs. BB ¶ 9, DD ¶ 5 (same). And, while Plaintiffs do not believe it is necessary, this Court has the discretionary authority to divide the proposed class into two subclasses. *See Annunziato v. Collecto, Inc.*, 293 F.R.D. 329, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[T]he court . . . has broad discretion to modify the class definition as appropriate to provide the necessary precision.") (quotation omitted); *cf.* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C) ("An order that grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.").

Putative class members' claims "depend upon a common contention" that is "of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." *Wal-Mart*, 564 U.S. at 350. The commonality requirement is satisfied because all class members allege the same injuries and raise the same set of common questions, and because the relief sought by all class members is the same.

3. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Members of the Proposed Class

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims of the class representatives be "typical of the claims . . . of the class." To establish typicality, "a class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members." *Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon*, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (quotation omitted). The "typicality requirement is satisfied when each class member's claim arises from the same course of events and each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's liability." *Robidoux*, 987 F.2d at 936; *see also Shahriar*, 659 F.3d at 252 (finding typicality where plaintiffs' evidence showed that all class members were subject to the challenged policies of the defendants).

In this way, commonality and typicality "tend to merge" because "[b]oth serve as guideposts for determining whether, under the particular circumstances, maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence." *Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw.*, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13.

Here, Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the proposed class because they proceed under the same legal theories, seek the same relief, and have suffered the same injuries. Like each proposed class member, Plaintiffs have been subject to Defendants' policy, which has

resulted or will result in the denial of Plaintiffs' adjustment applications. "Indeed, the factual situation and the legal theories upon which the Plaintiff[s] bring[] this action are not only typical of the entire class, but are nearly identical. Therefore, the Plaintiff[s] ha[ve] established that the typicality requirement is met in this case." *Assif v. Titleserv, Inc.*, 288 F.R.D. 18, 24 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).

4. The Named Plaintiffs Will Adequately Protect the Interests of the Proposed Class Members, and Counsel Are Qualified to Litigate this Action

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." "Adequacy is twofold: the proposed class representative must have an interest in vigorously pursuing the claims of the class and must have no interests antagonistic to the interests of other class members." *Denny v. Deutsche Bank AG*, 443 F.3d 253, 268 (2d Cir. 2006). To defeat certification, any conflict must be "fundamental." *Id.* (quotation omitted).

The named Plaintiffs and all class members are subject to the same challenged USCIS policy. All have the same interest in ensuring that USCIS recognize that their grant of TPS constitutes an inspection and admission for purposes of adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. Their mutual goal is to have this Court declare unlawful Defendants' challenged policy and issue injunctive relief that requires USCIS to treat a grant of TPS as an inspection and admission for purposes of adjustment of status. The named Plaintiffs are not seeking any monetary damages, but instead seek the same injunctive relief for themselves and the class as a whole. They have no interests antagonistic to those of other class members. Therefore, they will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members they seek to represent.

Plaintiffs' counsel also "will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). "The adequacy of counsel requirement is satisfied 'where the class attorneys are experienced in the field or have demonstrated professional competence in other ways, such as

by the quality of the briefs and the arguments during the early stages of the case.'" *D.S. ex rel. S.S. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 255 F.R.D. 59, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting *Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.*, 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1106 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), *rev'd on other grounds sub nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co.*, 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008)). Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from the American Immigration Council and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project. Counsel have a demonstrated commitment to protecting the rights and interests of noncitizens and have experience in handling complex and class action litigation, including in the immigration field. *See* Exhs. U, Kenney Dec., V, Second Realmuto Dec., and W, Adams Dec. Class counsel have the experience and ability to zealously and effectively represent both named and absent class members. *Id*.

5. Plaintiffs' Class Definition Is Ascertainable

The Second Circuit also recognizes an implied requirement of ascertainability under Rule 23. In *In re Petrobras Sec. Litig.*, the Court "clarif[ied] the scope" of the ascertainability doctrine, holding that "a class is ascertainable if it is defined using objective criteria that establish a membership with definite boundaries." 862 F.3d 250, 257 (2d Cir. 2017); *see also id.* at 265 ("declin[ing] to adopt a heightened ascertainability theory that requires a showing of administrative feasibility at the class certification stage").

The class is not overbroad or indefinite, and class members are readily identifiable as to time and context. Here, objective criteria clearly define the boundaries of the class. Membership is defined by type of initial entry into the United States, current immigration status, and application of Defendants' policy to a class member's adjustment application. Thus, the context is limited to adjustment applications subject to USCIS' policy. Moreover, Defendants issue TPS to a finite number of individuals for a finite period of time. And, as to ascertainably, Defendants

are "uniquely positioned to ascertain class membership" because USCIS knows the exact number of visa petitions filed on behalf of TPS holders, as well as the exact number and location of adjustment applications filed by TPS holders. *Barahona-Gomez*, 167 F.3d at 1237. Because "[n]either the parties nor the properties that are the subject of this litigation are fundamentally indeterminate," the ascertainability requirement has been met. *Id.* at 270.

B. Plaintiffs Satisfy the Requirements of Rule 23(b)

Rule 23(b)(2), under which Plaintiffs seek certification, requires that Defendants have "acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." The underlying premise of subsection (b)(2) is "the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them." *Wal-Mart Stores*, 564 U.S. at 360 (quotation omitted). In other words, Rule 23(b)(2) is met where "a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class." *Id.* Rule 23(b)(2) "is only applicable where the relief sought is exclusively or predominantly injunctive or declaratory." *Coco*, 233 F.R.D. at 115 (quotation omitted). "Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is particularly appropriate in civil rights litigation" as it "is designed to assist and is most commonly relied upon by litigants seeking institutional reform in the form of injunctive relief." *Hill*, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 357 (quotations omitted). The relief sought in this case only reinforces the "the Second Circuit's general preference . . . for granting rather than denying class certification." *Gortat*, 257 F.R.D. at 361.

This suit falls directly within the ambit of Rule 23(b)(2). Plaintiffs challenge a policy that is applicable to both Plaintiffs and all class members. Because this policy concerns a

threshold eligibility requirement for adjustment of status, it bars review of the merits of any individual adjustment application; thus, it applies without regard to any differences in Plaintiffs' and class members' cases. Plaintiffs primarily seek declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy Defendants' statutory violations. They ask the Court to declare that Defendants' policy violates the INA; to declare that, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4), a grant of TPS constitutes an inspection and admission for purposes of adjustment of status; to order Defendants to give effect to the plain language of the statute, acknowledging the grant of TPS as an inspection and admission for purposes of adjudicating Plaintiffs' and class members' adjustment applications; and to reopen cases in which they erroneously applied the challenged policy. Plaintiffs seek no monetary damages for the substantial harms Defendants' actions cause Plaintiffs, their families, and their employers. The requested declaratory and injunctive relief would apply to Plaintiffs and all proposed class members in identical fashion. Therefore, Defendants' actions have made final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); *see also Nicholson v. Williams*, 205 F.R.D. 92, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Rule 23(b)(2) is designed to assist litigants seeking institutional change in the form of injunctive relief.") (citing cases).

C. Multi-Circuit Class Certification Is Both Appropriate and Necessary

The scope of the proposed class appropriately covers all individuals whose adjustment of status applications are subject to USCIS' written policy as opposed to the decision of a court of appeals. As such, the proposed class consists of TPS holders residing within the geographic boundaries of the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits. Certification of a class based on being subject to an unlawful policy is appropriate, "since the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of

the violation established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class." *Califano v. Yamasaki*, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).

Although two district courts outside the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have ruled on behalf of similarly situated plaintiffs, the application of those cases is limited to the two plaintiffs who brought those cases. Notably, Defendants have opted not to pursue appeals that would have resolved the issue in the circuits in which those district courts are located. *See Bonilla v. Johnson*, 149 F. Supp. 3d 1135 (D. Minn. 2016); *Medina v. Beers*, 65 F. Supp. 3d 419 (E.D. Pa. 2014). Indeed, in both cases, despite initially appealing the district court orders granting relief, Defendants opted to withdraw or dismiss the appeals rather than permit the relevant Court of Appeals to resolve the issue. *Medina v. Secretary of U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security*, No. 15-1045 (3d Cir. May 5, 2015) (unpublished) (dismissing case pursuant to parties' stipulation); *Bonilla v. Johnson*, No. 16-2067 (8th Cir. July 22, 2016) (unpublished) (granting appellants' motion to dismiss appeal). Instead, Defendants persist in applying the policy rejected by the district courts even in the districts which issued those decisions. *See* Exh. H, Hohenstein Dec. ¶¶ 4-5; Exh. S, Peterson Dec. ¶ 6.

Consequently, unless individual TPS holders have the resources to retain counsel to file an individual action in federal court, they are left without any recourse to seek the relief provided pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1254a(f)(4). Because of the resources required to purse such litigation, most proposed class members never will be eligible to adjust to lawful permanent residence absent nationwide class certification. In previous years, the impact of Defendants' unlawful policy was not as severe because proposed class members, at a minimum, could apply to renew their TPS. However, the Secretary's decisions to terminate TPS for hundreds of thousands of individuals over the course of the next five to eighteen months has greatly increased the potential

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harm for putative class members who would otherwise qualify to adjust their status based on their relationship to a U.S. family member or employer. The resolution of this issue is now imperative and must occur sufficiently prior to the expiration of TPS for proposed class members, so that they are left with time to prepare and file their applications for adjustment of status.

Multi-Circuit certification is also appropriate because there is no other case pending before any Court of Appeals addressing the issues presented in this case.[11] Similarly, there are no other putative class actions pending in any district court addressing the issues raised in this action. To the extent that there are a handful of individual cases pending in district courts, none of those cases will resolve the matter for named Plaintiffs or putative class members.

Furthermore, nationwide classes challenging immigration policies and practices are regularly certified given that immigration policy is based on uniform, federal law. *See*, *e.g.*, *Inland Empire - Immigrant Youth Collective v. Nielsen*, No. EDCV 17-2048 PSG (SHKx), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34871 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018) (unpublished); *Hamama v. Adducci*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 997 (M.D. Mich. 2018); *Nio v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 323 F.R.D. 28 (D.D.C. 2017); *Mendez Rojas v. Johnson*, No. C16-1024RSM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73262 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 10, 2017) (unpublished). The fact that USCIS does not rely on its policy to adjudicate adjustment of status applications in certain parts of the country (and instead relies on

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[11] Moreover, it is particularly appropriate to file for class certification within the contours of the Second Circuit given that outside of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals—which has already resolved this issue—the Second Circuit adjudicates the largest number of appeals stemming from orders under the Immigration and Nationality Act. *See* United States Courts, U.S. Courts of Appeals - Judicial Business 2017, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business-2017 (last visited June 11, 2018) (noting that 14 percent of immigration appeals were filed in the Second Circuit, second only to the Ninth Circuit).

precedent court of appeals decisions) does not undermine the need for establishing a uniform approach in the remaining circuits.

Indeed, Defendants regularly issue rules to be applied across the country while explicitly carving out application of those rules to any circuit that has issued a contrary interpretation. For instance, interpreting the statutory phrase "admitted in any status," the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) noted its disagreement with prior decisions by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, and directed that its interpretation be applied "[i]n all other circuits that have yet to address the issue." *Matter of Castillo Angulo*, 27 I&N Dec. 194, 202 (BIA 2018). Numerous other interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act are subject to carve-outs in specific circuits based on existing precedent. *See, e.g.*, *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 26 I&N Dec. 826, 829 n.3 (BIA 2016) (noting circuit split in application of legal framework resulting from divergent readings of statutory phrase); *Matter of E.W. Rodriguez*, 25 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2012) (holding that its statutory interpretation applies in jurisdictions outside of Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits). Similarly, Defendants' formal policy laid out in the instant case carves out application for individuals residing in the Sixth Circuit. USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 7, Part B, Ch. 2(A)(5) at n.56. Plaintiffs have properly tailored their proposed class definition to include only those jurisdictions in which Defendants will deny their applications based upon this unlawful policy, excluding those jurisdictions in which Defendants instead base their decisions on a court of appeals' decision that prohibits application of the policy.

To avoid a piecemeal approach that deprives TPS holders across the country of the opportunity to seek relief from Defendants' restrictive interpretation, this Court should grant Plaintiffs' motion for certification.

In the alternative, Plaintiffs request that the Court certify a class consisting of individuals

residing within the Second Circuit.[12] This Court "has broad discretion to modify the class definition as appropriate to provide the necessary precision." *Morangelli v. Chemed Corp.*, 275 F.R.D. 99, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quotation omitted); *see also Robidoux*, 987 F.2d at 937 ("A court is not bound by the class definition proposed in the complaint and should not dismiss the action simply because the complaint seeks to define the class too broadly."). For the same reasons applicable to the proposed class, *see supra* §§ III.A, III.B, a class consisting only of proposed class members residing within the Second Circuit meets all the requirements of Rule 23.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant their Motion for Class Certification and enter the accompanying proposed certification order.

Dated June 12, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

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[12] Even if the Court were to modify the scope of the class, Plaintiffs Reyes, Cantarero Argueta, and Avilez Rojas—who reside outside the Second Circuit—should be permitted to remain in this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). *See Wilson v. Toussie*, No. 01-CV-4568 (DRH) (WDW), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23756 at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2003) (unpublished) ("Rule 20(a) is designed to encourage joinder so long as such joinder would be 'consistent with fairness to the parties.'") (quoting *Wyant v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.*, 881 F.Supp. 919, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)); *see also United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs*, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) ("Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged."). Furthermore, venue remains proper for Plaintiffs who reside outside this district. *See, e.g.*, *Holtzman v. Richardson*, 361 F.Supp. 544, 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), *rev'ed on other grounds*, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (explaining that, in an action against a federal officer or agency, the existence of plaintiffs residing outside of district "does not prevent the venue being proper for all plaintiffs, since only one plaintiff need be a resident of the district").

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